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‘As a woman…’; ‘As a Muslim…’: 
Subjects, positions and counter-terrorism powers in the United 
Kingdom 
This article presents findings from original focus group research on the importance of identity claims 
within public understandings of counter-terrorism across the UK. Following a review of existing 
literature on the terrorism/counter-terrorism/identity nexus, the article introduces four prominent 
subject positions inhabited within public articulations of counter-terrorism powers: the ‘Muslim’, the 
‘target’, the ‘woman’ and the ‘unaffected’. Positions such as these, we argue, both enable and inhibit 
particular normative, political and anecdotal claims about counter-terrorism frameworks and their 
impact upon the body politic. This, we suggest, is demonstrative of the co-constitutive role between 
counter-terrorism and identity claims. Thus, on the one hand, counter-terrorism initiatives work to 
position individuals socially, politically, and culturally: (re)producing various religious, ethnic and 
other identities. Yet, at the same time, specific subject positions are integral to the articulation of 
people’s attitudes toward developments in counter-terrorism. The article concludes by thinking 
through some of the implications of this, including for resistance toward securitising moves and for 
citizenship more generally.  
Key words: counter-terrorism, terrorism, identity, subjectivity, religion, ethnicity, gender 
Introduction 
As noted in this issue’s introduction, the present counter-terrorism milieu is marked by an 
extensive blurring of the boundaries between social and security policy (Ragazzi, this issue); 
a blurring that is particularly noticeable with the stretching of concepts such as risk 
management, responsibilisation and community cohesion (Worley, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2012) 
across each of these domains. One significant consequence of this has been the emergence of 
a particular governance of difference, with that the “re-colonization” of social policy by the 
logic of security being particularly pronounced for racialized minorities (Ragazzi, this issue). 
In this article, we set out to explore the interrelationship of this dynamic with identity 
formation in the UK, drawing on findings from original focus research into public 
understandings and experiences of counter-terrorism. Following a review of relevant 
scholarship on the counter-terrorism/identity nexus, the article introduces our research 
methodology before exploring four types of identity claimed by contributors to our focus 
groups. These refer to the ‘Muslim’, the ‘target’, the ‘woman’, and the ‘unaffected’.  
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Through analysis of these four positions, the article makes three arguments. First, 
“ordinary” individuals claim a range of different subject positions in their efforts to make 
sense of counter-terrorism powers and the various effects thereof. Second, many individuals 
believe that counter-terrorism powers work to position or identity them as particular types of 
political, gendered, religious or other subject. And, third, the co-constitutive and complex 
nature of this relationship has implications for evaluations as well as understandings of 
counter-terrorism powers. One potential implication is that rather than aiding processes of 
cohesion, counter-terrorism measures may contribute to the very weakening thereof they 
purport to address.  
 
(Counter-)terrorism powers and identity 
The relationship between identity and (counter-)terrorism has been much discussed within the 
post-9/11 “boom” in terrorism research. One prominent strand of this work focuses on the 
importance of individual identities, moral convictions and personal experiences as triggers for 
an individual’s “radicalisation” (compare Sageman, 2008 and Kundnani, 2014; 2015). 
Despite this concept’s significant limitations (Schmid, 2013: 25; Baker-Beall et al., 2015), 
understandings of terrorism as a product, in part, of personal identity crisis have proliferated 
across Western counter-radicalisation initiatives. The UK’s Channel Project, for instance, 
identifies transformations in friendship groups or social networks, personal upheaval, and the 
voicing of political grievances as indicators of vulnerability to radicalisation (Kundnani, 
2014: 154).  
A second literature comprises constructivist explorations of terrorism and/or Islamic 
extremisms as forms of ‘otherness’ or ‘negative ideographs’ (Winkler, 2006) sustaining 
western national identities (e.g. Jackson, 2005; Croft, 2006; Nayak, 2006). Richard Jackson 
(2010), for example, identifies two roles for national identity in the context of the ‘war on 
terror’. The first is as something to be appealed to in efforts to mobilise public support for the 
conflict (see also Holland, 2012). The second is in demonising or shaping the enemy as that 
“we” are not, (re)affirming a collective self of national identity. Croft (2012: 6), similarly, 
argues that in the post-7/7 period: ‘Britishness… has been constructed in contradistinction to 
a newly securitized identity: that of the Radical Other, the ‘jihadi’ British Muslim’. Such 
constructions are also, importantly, frequently gendered, with the Western “we” and non-
Western “they”, often organised around differential treatments of women (Hunt and Rygiel, 
2006; Shepherd, 2006; Brown, 2008; Steans, 2008).  
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The third way in which questions of counter-terrorism and identity have been debated 
concerns multiculturalism. In particular, attention has focussed on policymakers’ perceptions 
that multiculturalism (or the failure thereof) is responsible for a lack of integration (amongst 
British Muslims especially) and social cohesion, providing an environment in which 
radicalisation might prosper. David Cameron’s (2011) Munich speech offers a prominent 
example: 
 
Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate 
lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream… This hands-off tolerance has only served 
to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling 
rootless… Now for sure, they don’t turn into terrorists overnight, but what we see… is a process of 
radicalisation. 
 
As Meer and Modood (2009: 474) put it, ‘multiculturalism is widely believed to have been 
responsible for domestic terrorism’. This sense – prominent post-7/7 – that, ‘The problem 
stemmed from (warped) Islam’ (Croft, 2012: 1) has, for critics, contributed to a ‘wider 
project of reshaping the cultural identities of Muslims’ (Kundnani, 2014: 163; also Brown 
2008). Such attempts have been criticised for: (re)producing Muslim populations as a latent 
security threat (Heath-Kelly, 2013); creating troubling dichotomies between moderate and 
radical Islam, or “good” and “bad” Muslims (Maira, 2009; Brown and Saeed, 2014); and 
shaping new “suspect communities” (Hillyard, 1993; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). The 
effects of this on “ordinary” people can be complex. As Mythen et al (2009: 748) put it, 
reflecting on their recent work with British Muslims: 
 
Pakistani Britons are in the middle of an ideological tug-of-war, being pressured to declare their 
affiliations and loyalties and come to an accommodation somewhere between the enticements of 
radical Islamism at one extreme and government notions of multicultural British citizenship at the 
other. The young Muslims we spoke to are having to construct and maintain their sense of self and 
community in a physical and imagined environment in which they are paradoxically cast as a threat to 
the security of the nation and are invited to align more readily with its ‘core values’ (Mythen, Walklate 
and Khan, 2009: 748, our emphasis) 
 
As the above indicates, there exists a vital and diverse literature incorporating a variety of 
theoretical and normative positions on the relationship between identity and counter-terrorism 
policy. Despite this research, however, numerous questions remain as to how identity claims 
relate to counter-terrorism powers. Do certain groups feel directly targeted, for instance? Are 
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such dynamics totalising, such that all Muslims or all (south) Asians, for example, relate to 
counter-terrorism measures similarly? What is the impact of counter-terrorism powers on 
experiences of collective identities such as “Britishness”? And, what types of subject position 
do counter-terrorism powers and discourse facilitate? It is to these questions that this article is 
addressed. 
 
Subjects, discourse and the construction of identity 
In his well-known and important discussion, ‘What is an Author?’, Michel Foucault (1969a) 
famously sets out to overturn traditional understandings of the relationship between text and 
producer. Here, Foucault invites us to ask not how a pre-existing subject produces discourse 
and thus meaning for the world. Rather, to focus on how discourse constitutes or make 
possible the identitied subject: ‘How, under what conditions, and in what forms can 
something like a subject appear in the order of discourse? What place can it occupy in each 
type of discourse, what functions can it assume, and by obeying what rules?’ (Foucault 
1969a: 118).  
 Foucault’s words are an important reminder of the significance of discursive contexts 
– or, ‘a number of rules, styles, inventions to be found in the cultural environment’ (Foucault 
1984: 51) – in the formation of specific selves and others. His framing here – and in his 
discussion of ‘enunciative modalities’ in Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1969b: 55-61) 
– however, hints at a structuralism less apparent in his later, genealogical, writings.i For, the 
formation of identity involves a creative engagement with those possibilities afforded by 
discourses on (in our case) counter-terrorism policy and multiculturalism. Especially once we 
recognise that such discourses are incomplete, malleable and, often, overlapping. This is why 
Laclau’s distinction between subject positions and subjectivity is a useful one (see Howarth 
2004: 264): the former referring to those places carved out within seemingly stable discourses 
(teacher, homosexual, terrorist), and the latter the capacity required to identify with, remake, 
or reimagine existing or new subject positions.   
 The interplay between, and contingent outcomes of, self-identification and (external) 
categorisation is a theme that characterises much contemporary work on identity (see Jenkins 
2000). For Stuart Hall (2000: 19), identity therefore refers to: 
 
the meeting point, the point of suture, between, on the one hand, the discourses and practices which 
attempt to ‘interpellate’, speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, 
and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which 
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can be ‘spoken’. Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which 
discursive practices construct for us. 
 
Such attachments are neither permanent nor singular (see Sen 2006), and one’s ability to 
negotiate or identify with a particular subject position is of course variable; a product, in part, 
of ‘hegemonic cultures and spatial orderings that define who can claim a particular identity, 
where and who cannot’ (Valentine and Sporton 2009: 172).  
In this article, we draw on these insights to explore how contemporary discourse 
around counter-terrorism powers has made possible the emergence and performance of 
particular identity claims. Such identity claims are seen as specific to, and situated within, the 
research contexts of their production, as well as broader discourses on (in)security that, ‘‘tell 
us who we must be’ and then ‘how we might stay that way’ (Walker, cited in Vaughan-
Williams and Stevens 2015: 4). Who we might be is, of course, always intersectional; a 
product of diverse, overlapping and interrelated experiences (e.g. of oppression and 
discrimination) and identity claims (e.g. gender, class, ethnicity). (Crenshaw 1991; see also, 
inter alia, Yuval Davis, 2006; Collins and Chep, 2013). The concept’s emergence from a 
demand for greater recognition of the ‘distinct and frequently conflicting dynamics that 
shaped the lived experience of subjects in…social locations’ (McCall 2005: 1780) points to 
the complex ways in which traditional identity categories (such as of gender, age, religion, 
class) may combine in situating individual and collective subjects within shifting complexes 
of relations of power and oppression. Although this article does not employ intersectionality 
as a specific research methodology (see Cho et al 2013), our discussion does set out to 
explore the ways in which participants in our research claimed, negotiated and resisted 
traditional identity categories in their sense-making efforts around counter-terrorism powers.  
In doing this, the article adopts what McCall (2005) terms an intracategorical 
approach to intersectionality; one which does not seek ‘to deny the importance – both 
material and discursive – of categories but to focus on the process by which they are 
produced, experienced, reproduced, and resisted in everyday life’ (McCall 2005: 1783). 
Following Wilson (2013:1), for whom, ‘Individuals locate themselves, and are located, in 
relation to the intersections of various structural definitions of “identity” and the resulting 
experiences can engender diverse outcomes’, our purpose here is to reflect upon the specific 
definitions of identity invoked in the context of counter-terrorism powers, and the variable 
understandings and implications this involves. Seemingly coherent subject positions – and the 
connections between them – are, therefore, approached here as contingent, variable and 
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potentially unstable. At the same time, we are keen to show how such positionings and their 
intersections do significant social and political work - allowing participants in our research to 
make sense of their world, and the place of self and other therein. Thus: 
 
What is important is to analyse how specific positionings and (not necessarily corresponding) identities 
and political values are constructed and interrelate and affect each other in particular locations and 
contexts. One cannot assume the same effect or constellation each time and, hence, the investigation of 
the specific social, political and economic processes involved in each historical instance is important 
(Yuval Davis, 2006: 200). 
 
Methodology 
The findings contained in this article draw on fourteen focus groups conducted with a range 
of UK-based communities in 2010. The focus groups concentrated on the impact of counter-
terrorism on everyday life, citizenship and security. Eighty-one individuals participated in the 
research: 48 women and 33 men selected via a purposive sampling strategy and recruited 
through a combination of enumeration, snowballing and organisation sampling techniques. 
The groups were organised around two primary factors: geographical residence 
(metropolitan/non-metropolitan) and self-designated ethnicity (black/white/Asian), taking 
place in London and Birmingham (metropolitan), and Oldham, Swansea, Llanelli and 
Oxfordshire (non-metropolitan). Because these focus groups were conducted against a 
backdrop of suspicion and concern around security, policing and surveillance in the context 
of counter-terrorism, more detailed demographic information on our participants was not 
collected. This decision had both pragmatic and normative drivers: namely a desire to avoid 
discouraging participation, and a – more significant – desire to avoid contributing to potential 
anxieties of participants. This lack of more detailed demographic data which might, for 
instance, include detail on age, class or sexuality, limits aspects of our analysis, but enabled 
the research to proceed.ii  
This research design means we make no claim to statistical representativeness, and 
there are, of course, potential selection and researcher biases to our ‘findings’. It may be, for 
instance, that individuals willing to participate in academic research on counter-terrorism 
measures are those with a particular interest in, or experience of, policy in this area. 
Similarly, the framing and order of focus group questions, as well as our presence in the room 
as moderators, almost certainly shaped discussion. The opinions – and identities – discussed 
in this article should therefore be seen as a product of collaboration between researchers and 
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multiple participants within specific times and spaces, rather than an effort to capture ‘true’, 
much less representative, opinions on counter-terrorism powers rendered imperfect by a 
‘researcher effect’. As Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2015: 7) argue: ‘The assumption in 
critical focus-group research work is not that the subject and his/her views pre-exist the 
situation in which the discussion takes place, but that it is via the interaction with others that 
this identity and knowledge are constituted’. Thus, with Jackson and Hall (2013), we 
approach our findings as situated in, and specific to, the context of their production. 
The focus groups employed a range of deliberately open questions (see Morgan, 
1996; Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999), inviting individuals to discuss contemporary counter-
terrorism powers and their impact. Specifically, participants were asked to: evaluate the 
legitimacy of particular measures such as stop and search powers and pre-trial detention 
periods; outline alternative, more desirable, counter-terrorism strategies; and (at the start of 
each focus group) explore the meaning of security. Follow-up questions varied – and 
according to the development of the conversation within each group. Specific questions about 
identity were not asked; such information emerged spontaneously in the course of discussion.   
The analysis in this article was generated using a ‘framework’ approach to qualitative 
discourse analysis (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002). This involves a systematic sifting and 
organising of qualitative material such that large volumes of data can be summarised in a 
manner grounded in participants’ own accounts (Jones, 2000: 560). Following an 
‘immersive’ reading of the transcript data, we generated a thematic framework of four broad 
identity positions: “the Muslim”, “the target”, “the woman” and “the unaffected”. A second 
reading ‘through’ this framework then involved coding and redistributing our data under each 
of these positions, identifying specific sub-categories for each. These (sub-)categories were 
used to structure the following presentation and analysis of our findings, which reproduces 
the words of our participants as directly as possible.  
 
Public understandings of the identity/counter-terrorism nexus 
The remainder of this paper presents its empirical contribution via exploration of the ways in 
which individuals constitute self and other in their telling of stories around counter-terrorism. 
The four positions it explores - the Muslim, the target, the woman, and the unaffected – all 
come out of the focus group discussions, and span those perceived (often by others) to be 
impacted, often adversely, by counter-terrorism powers. And, those identities claimed by the 
self in evaluations of this policy domain. They are, in other words, both self-identifications, 
and subject positions (Jenkins, 2000). 
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“Muslim” 
The identity “Muslim” has become an increasingly complex category in recent years, perhaps 
moving for some from a singularly religious designation to what Olivier Roy (2002) refers to 
as a form of “neo-ethnicity”. Under the latter, Muslim is not simply a category of religious 
believer; rather, it approaches a cultural and ethnic designation. As demonstrated below, 
although identifications of self or others as ‘Muslim’ were a common feature across our focus 
groups, such identifications were not employed consistently. In some examples, an unspoken 
racialised dualism emerges between white/British people, on the one hand; and, Muslims on 
the other. In other uses, such understandings are either absent or resisted. Although all of 
those self-identifying as Muslim in our groups also identified as “Asian”, this should not be 
taken as our endorsement of any Muslim/white binary. 
 Numerous individuals spoke in our focus groups of being singled out by the state and 
its counter-terrorism measures for especial treatment because they were Muslim, with several 
arguing that such measures contribute directly to a climate of fear. In some cases, individuals 
referred to specific, personal experiences of counter-terrorism policies (stop and search, for 
example). In others, it was a broader sense of social dislocation and stigmatisation: what 
Blackwood et al. (2013: 1098) refer to as the ‘shadow of the collective experience’, for 
instance:  
 
government drives the way security categorises people… So when you're talking about security, the 
government pushing policies that are very, you know, racially or religiously based, but doing it in the 
sort of blanket nice sort of... we’re only guarding you against extremism, it’s all for your own good… 
you're doing it in a way that allows others to see that, yes, they need to be watched and yes, they need 
to be kept an eye on.  And I think there’s an irresponsibility there that comes with government. 
(Oldham, Asian, Female) 
 
Thus, for one individual, counter-terrorism powers ‘victimise the Muslim community’, 
creating ‘an air of Islamophobia’ (London, Asian, Male). For a female participant in a 
separate group, similarly: ‘you are securing the majority of the population, the majority of the 
white population, from this minority Muslim population that you have to regard with 
suspicion for your own safety’ (Oldham, Asian, Female). This belief that after 9/11 all 
Muslims were viewed with new forms of suspicion is well illustrated by the following focus 
group in Oldham: 
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A:   I get that from, you know, when a white person is looking at me, you know, they do.  
B:   You feel it, yeah 
A:  They have this fear, they actually look at you and say, right, what connection can she 
have with the terrorists.  
B:   I remember being asked where I was going to bomb next. 
[…] 
A:   After 9/11 things changed, overnight, I think for us. It really did.  
C:  Because I was at secondary school … and I remember people saying, oh, your lot, 
your lot did this. And I’m like what do you mean, my lot, I don't understand what 
you mean by my lot. (Oldham, Asian, Female) 
 
The experience of riskiness was an outcome, for one participant, of the widespread view of 
Muslim communities as unknown and other to majority (ethnic, national and religious) 
groups in the UK. Having asked: ‘How would you as English people, how would you… on 
the other side, deal with terrorism?’ one participant concludes this is difficult as: ‘We all look 
the same, we all, we grow a beard and we wear a uniform… This is alien to them’ 
(Birmingham, Asian, Male, our emphasis). As he continued, the “unexceptional” lives of 
many actual terrorists create additional policy challenges whereby because no specific 
Muslims are exceptionally suspicious, no Muslims can be fully trustworthy either: 
 
Every terrorist that’s ever been, ever died blowing something up, the local community talk about how 
lovely and normal the guy was. He didn’t have horns growing out of his ass… You know, and so what 
effect does that have? That has had even more effect on people that watch the news and they see these 
people saying that they were perfectly normal guys. He was a teacher, he was a this, that and the other, 
or they were doctors, they did this and that, they were normal people. They were fine. They came home 
for tea… our kids played together and all this kind of stuff, so then I think that’s going to instil a sense 
of paranoia in the community, because people will think, well we can’t…all these Muslims, they might 
seem fine, but tomorrow are they going to blow us up? (Birmingham, Asian, Male) 
 
This discussion emerged in a debate about the extent to which “Muslims” are viewed as a 
homogenous bloc. Where the above participant flattens differences between Muslims, others 
argued, in contrast, that specific ways of presenting as Muslim increase suspicion: 
 
A: If you’ve got a headscarf or you’ve got a long beard, or you dress in a… you are again going to be 
targeted a lot more. 
B: Not necessarily, because I went for job interviews, harking back three years, and at the door, the 
lady goes, oh, have you got any ID?... The parting comment, she said, as long as you’re not a terrorist 
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I’ll let you in, and I found that quite offensive… Even though I wasn’t wearing a headscarf. She did say 
it humorously but I found it offensive. (Birmingham, Asian, Female) iii 
 
These excerpts indicate the fluidity of religious, ethnic, national and cultural identifications 
within the UK. Just as our first participant imagines a border between Englishness and the 
(Muslim) group of participants, another female participant – discussing attacks on women 
wearing the headscarf – argued this happens: ‘Because somebody says that’s them, we are us, 
and we are British, and they are weird. We are British and they are weird, and they are them 
and we are us’ (London, Asian, Female). This distinction between an English “them” and a 
Muslim “us” was contested by some of our participants (see also [Author], [Date]). It was, 
however, widely shared, including amongst those who believed their “Britishness” now 
contested by others: 
 
I've been here for 40 years. I wasn't born here but I was very small when I came here, and I’m still a 
foreigner, I’m still an alien and my children are going to be treated like that as well… Until they lose 
their identity and start wearing mini skirts or having blonde hair or whatever, they start looking white, 
they’re still going to be foreigners. And I can't go back to Pakistan. Part of me is Pakistan [but] I've 
hardly got anything… to go back to… or take my children back to… Nobody thinks of me as British. 
I’m a Paki middle-aged woman. That's how they see me, Paki. They don't know I've got a British 
passport and I've had it for such a long time, for 37, 38 years or something. That still does not make me 
British. (Oldham, Asian, Female). 
 
This woman’s attachment to Britain had been eroded by a post-9/11 narrowing of access to 
British identity. After discussing a ‘humiliating’ search at an airportiv, this respondent  
claimed not to ‘feel… British as much’, noting: ‘I should be allowed to be accepted in this 
country. But after that last ten years of things like that happening, the way I’m looked at, I 
don't feel as part of the British society, as accepted.’ (Oldham, Asian, Female). Others 
pointed to the temporal sedimentation of these subject positions, and the implications of this 
for ‘second generation’ migrants: 
 
The moment you're tanned, you know, you're in this country, that’s it, you are part of that Asian group 
or you're part of that terrorist group over there and you're already labelled, you're already stereotyped 
as well… My mum’s been here a long time… my mum’s been here for about 30 years. My dad’s been 
here for a long time, my granddad’s have been here for a long time, how far down the line from a 
generation point of view do I have to go in order for me to be valued in my own country because I was 
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born here? My dad keeps talking about back home; you know, back home’s not me. This is back home. 
(Oldham, Asian, Male, our emphasis) 
 
The above, we argue, indicates the extent to which the post-9/11 environment has impacted 
upon UK-based individuals identifying as Muslim (e.g. Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009; 
O’Loughlin and Gillespie, 2012). For many of our participants, this environment’s 
contribution to the (re)production of particular subject positions directly influenced their own 
self-identification (see Jenkins, 2000). Counter-terrorism practices, in our findings, add 
further complexity to this by inflecting certain categories with meaning (Muslim as “other” or 
threatening), which in turn shapes self-identifications (the extent to which individuals see 
themselves, and/or the extent to which they can attach themselves to different categories such 
as “British”). Yet such dynamics are themselves subject to intersections, including markers of 
gendered identity such as beards or burqas, and ethnic or national identifications which may 
be seen as collocated with – or entirely disconnected from – the Muslim subject position. 
Whilst some individuals do resist any ‘them’/‘us’ interpretation of counter-terrorism policy in 
such starkly identitied terms ([Author], [Date]), the difficulty of many in attaching 
themselves (and being seen to be attached) or being denied access to (Blackwood et al., 2013) 
national cultures suggests that there are deeper, longer-term issues related to the (social) 
impacts of counter-terrorism, beyond incursions on formal rights and statuses. 
 
“Target” 
The above section focused on how those self-identified as Muslim felt singled out by 
contemporary counter-terrorism powers because they were Muslim. This perception of 
targeting, however, was far from limited to those individuals, with a number of participants in 
our research identifying as black expressing similar concerns. Frequently, such views were 
related to prior experiences of discrimination. The legacies of older policing controversies 
such as the “Sus” laws of the 1970s and 1980s (Gilroy, 1982; see also CT4, this issue), for 
instance, were invoked in critical evaluations of the ethnic profiling widely-associated with 
contemporary counter-terrorist powers. As one participant put it in relation to discriminatory 
policing: ‘when you select a few, and target a few, and then only use those laws because you 
think they're not from, shall I say indigenous people, and you use these laws on them… that’s 
the major problem for me’ (Swansea, Black, Male). Another, reviewing recent developments 
in this area, suggested:  
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Maybe if I were, if I weren’t black, I'd feel safer… but I feel that I’m the victim in this, when I see all 
these things because everything is aimed at a group of people, so I don't feel safe with these laws… But 
having at the back of my mind that I'm being watched, I'm being searched, I'm a target group, I'm not 
safe. I don't feel safe, or safer’ (Swansea, Black, Female).  
 
Many of our participants argued not only that they might become the target of counter-
terrorism powers because of racial profiling, but also that the existence of such powers would 
exacerbate problems of racism in the wider body politic. Some recounted experiences of 
abuse and harassment (see also [Author], [Date]), whilst others argued that measures like stop 
and search increased inter-communal tension: 
 
Yes, I'm aware of them… particularly… stop and search, and the fact that it's increased the number of 
stop and search overall and, you know, there has been some complaints. You know, people have been 
very vocal and there have been organisations… who have been very vocal in saying that it's creating 
racism. (Swansea, Black, Female) 
 
Others still echoed discussions explored in the above section - arguing that counter-terrorism 
powers complicated their relationship to experiences of “Britishness”. In a conversation about 
the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act’s provision for indefinite detention for 
foreign nationals suspected of terrorism, for instance, one participant asked: 
 
Where it says about foreign nationals, problem there again is for people like Jeremyv who were born 
here, are they going to be treated as foreign nationals, because when you're stopped and searched you're 
not asked if you’re British or not. The only thing is the colour of your skin, so will they ask you where 
you're born, and being born in England and having a British citizenship, does that exclude him, and I 
doubt that very much. (Swansea, Black, Female) 
 
As this suggests, the perceived focus of counter-terrorism policing on specific subjects 
(whether “foreign nationals” or “black” individuals) increases wariness of being targeted. 
Important, though, is the distinction here with Muslim identities discussed above, where 
participants believed themselves targeted because of their Muslim identity. Whilst some non-
white participants in our research did position themselves as unfairly targeted by counter-
terrorism powers, this largely stemmed from a sense that such powers ‘exacerbated’ existing 
racial tensions, rather than constituted their direct, intended focus. 
 It is important to note that this experience of targeting was – again – far from 
universal amongst individuals identifying as members of minority ethnic communities. One 
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Asian (non-Muslim) participant, for example, recounted being frequently stopped by border 
police when travelling for employment yet stated he ‘didn’t really mind… it is what it is’ 
(London, Asian, Male). The same participant elsewhere similarly positioned themselves as 
untargeted by counter-terrorism measures because: ‘if you’re a good citizen going about your 
day-to-day life, it doesn’t necessarily affect your day-to-day life’. This invocation of the 
figure of the “good citizen” signifies a far stronger attachment to a (British) citizenship than 
that of some of the participants above who believed themselves denied access to such a 
category. Quite what being a “good citizen” refers to is unclear. At a minimum, it perhaps 
implies “law abiding”, but may refer to being employed and may also be gendered (Shepherd, 
2006). The participant above – a lawyer – may have benefited from a class-based ability to 
claim the labels of “good citizen” and “British” in a way unavailable to individuals living 
more (economically) precarious lives. This raises the question as to whether intersections of 
ethnicity, race, class (as well as other factors such as gender, below) contribute to the 
production of a racial hierarchy (compare Bonilla Silva, 2004 and Song, 2004) around 
counter-terrorism, with certain ethnic minority groups (e.g. higher socio-economic, non-
Muslim) being perceived (and perceiving themselves) beyond the scope of such measures, 
where others might not. This in turn, spotlights the complexity of ethnic labels such as 
“black” and “white” which ‘cannot be grounded in a set of fixed transcultural or 
transcendental racial categories and… therefore [have] no guarantees in nature’ (Hall, 1996: 
444). What is important here, however, is the extent to which counterterrorism powers shape 
the extent to which individuals claim (or are able to claim), or reject (or are rejected from) 
specific identity markers, such as “black”, “white”, “Muslim”, and “British”. 
 
“Woman” 
In the above discussion we noted debate over the significance of particular identity markers 
(such as facial hair, headscarves or veils) in a counter-terrorism context. An important aspect 
of this is the impact of gender on expectations of stigmatisation and targeting. One mother, 
for instance, worried about her son, as ‘he’ll have a stubble and sometimes he lets it grow 
quite long… and you do worry up all night, thinking, when is he going to get home?’ 
(Birmingham, Asian, Female), suggesting that, for her, male identities were particularly at 
risk “of being [seen as] risky” (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Another female participant seemed to 
agree, suggesting she was less likely to be viewed with suspicion because, ‘as a woman I 
don’t have a lot more pressures than my [male] colleague’ (London, Asian, Female). In other 
discussions, however, performances of gendered identities by (some) women, especially with 
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regard to religious dress were seen to increase one’s risk of suspicion from other citizens or 
the state. As one female put it: ‘With the burqa, I stand out and I’m conspicuous… And you 
get the looks and the sly nudges and the comments behind your back’ (Oldham, Asian, 
Female). Another participant in the same group, discussing being stopped at an airport, stated 
‘whatever I do it’s always going to come back to the way I dress and the way I look, so 
there’s no point in fighting it’ (Oldham, Asian, Female). Thus, there may be a distinction here 
between those risks of social stigma to which women may feel more vulnerable because of, 
for instance, the veil (see Dwyer, 1999; Werbner, 2007); and, on the other hand being 
targeted by official security processes (which may disproportionately affect men).  
Discussions around gender such as the above also took place within focus groups of 
individuals not identifying as Muslim. One black female participant, for instance, suggested 
that ethnic minorities were more likely to be hostile to discriminatory counter-terrorism 
powers, before noting, ‘With the stop and search, I’m not largely affected by it, but maybe a 
young black male would be, so… although I’m concerned with that, I’m not so concerned 
because I’m not ultimately being directly affected’ (London, Black, Female). This echoes the 
point above that black participants in our research were less likely to base their negative 
evaluations of counter-terrorism powers upon direct (negative) experiences. Such questions 
around the intersection of gendered and ethnic identities were also found amongst white 
participants. For example, one participant addressed another’s (white, female) comment that 
she didn’t feel concerned by stop and search by saying ‘no, but then [you] might do if you 
were a working class black male… police stop and search targets will massively affect black 
young males compared to white females’ (Oxford, White, Female). Another participant in the 
same group, who knew one of the victims of the 7/7 attacks personally, stated: ‘I didn’t feel 
that these had a personal effect on me in London either, or here; but then that might be 
because I’m a white female’ (Oxford, White, Female).  
The above reinforces the importance of recognising intersectionalities between ethnic, 
gendered and other subject positions in the context of counter-terrorism powers. Some of our 
female Muslim participants felt that counter-terrorism powers contributed to a climate where 
they were less secure and subject to social abuse and stigma, as well, in some instances, to 
negative experiences with state security apparatuses. In such instances, their gendered 
identity increased perceptions of vulnerability. Other women, and, indeed, other ethnic 
minority women, felt protected because their gender positioned them at a greater distance 
from security practices and social stigma. Given the limitations of our data (and its lack of 
wider socio-demographic information) we are not able to specify precise factors which 
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determine whether, and why, women might feel exposed or protected by their gendered 
identity in this context; something that might be probed in further research. Yet, this suggests 
a complex, variable relation such that, for our participants, gender could both increase and 
decrease perceived exposure to security practices and associated experiences of 
discrimination, pointing to variable processes of what Mythen et al. (2013) refer to as ‘risk 
subjectification’ – how individuals come to be seen as dangerous by virtue of shared 
characteristics with the archetypal terrorist.  
 
“Unaffected” 
In our research we also spoke with a number of individuals who felt that their identity and 
lifestyle rendered them distant from, and unaffected by, the workings of counter-terrorism 
powers. As we have already seen, for some participants, variously being female, a “good 
citizen”, or of higher socio-economic class could reduce concerns about such powers. Beyond 
these, a number of white individuals in particular saw themselves as beyond the interest of 
those responsible for countering terrorism. Some of these – although not directly affected – 
did express concerns about contemporary counter-terrorism powers in an abstract sense, as 
well as engaging in efforts to empathise with those likely targeted ([Author], [Date]). One 
female, for instance, expressed her distaste for ‘a Big Brother state, where every single move 
is being watched’ (Oxford, White, Female). Others expressed related concerns about 
intrusions on civil liberties: 
 
A:  I almost feel like my liberty is threatened by most of them. 
B:  Yes, but I don’t think your liberty is really going to be threatened, because you ... you haven’t 
done anything wrong. (London, White, Female and Male) 
 
Here “not doing anything wrong” (which might be aligned with the “good citizen”) means 
such concerns are not directly experienced or expected by the speaking self. For some of 
these individuals, however, this negligibility did not stop them from imagining themselves 
into the situation of others. As one participant imagined the impact of the (now repealed) 
Control Order regime: 
 
If Sarah had a control order, as a foreign national, and was subjected to house arrest, and you weren’t 
allowed to move and associate and communicate… If people saw your house under house arrest, they 
will start to view you differently, even if you’re entirely innocent, and it starts to make people feel 
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suspicious of their community and of the people that they’re around… that’s quite a negative 
consequence of these powers. (Oxford, White, Female) 
 
This act of empathy reveals two things. First, expectations of remaining personally unaffected 
by counter-terrorism powers do not necessarily lead to a lack of concern about their impacts 
or excesses, at least in an abstract, hypothetical sense. Second, although well-intentioned, 
these efforts are themselves revealing of quite how distant such measures are seen to be. 
There are no actual cases for these participants to reflect on and it is only by constructing 
imaginary situations or a change of identity (“Sarah” was another participant in the group and 
not a “foreign national”) that one could think through the implications of being subject to 
counter-terrorism powers. To expect not to be subject to a control order or similar, is 
arguably not unreasonable, given that only around 50 people experienced these during the 
time they were in effect, (Casciani, 2011). Yet, such assurance was not widespread amongst 
many of our Asian, Muslim and black participants, where the ‘shadow of the collective 
experience’ (Blackwood et al. 2013: 1098) loomed large. 
A second grouping of white individuals reported a similar sense of distance from the 
workings of counter-terrorism powers. These people viewed counter-terrorism as a remote set 
of processes, with very limited (if any) direct impact upon themselves, as illustrated here: 
 
Moderator: What do you think of the effect of these sorts of measures on… you and those close 
to you. Do these have an effect, an impact, on your lives? 
A:  No. 
B:  No. 
C:  No. 
D:  No. 
B:  None at all. 
Moderator Do they make you feel any safer? 
C:  No. 
A:  No. 
B:  No. 
Moderator Is that because you don’t think they’re effective or some other reason? 
A: All this is happening on a level that never touches us. I mean, they don’t just go and 
pick somebody up and put them in indefinite confinement because somebody’s, you 
know, had a chat in a pub and this guy looks a bit dodgy. It’s all happening at a level 
that just doesn’t affect us. You know, it’s phone tapping and it’s email snooping and 
stuff like this, by the Secret Services. How’s that going to affect us? It’s going to 
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affect us at the bottom line where a bomb doesn’t go off in London, but at this level, 
no. (Oldham, White, Male (A), Female (B, C & D). 
 
It is perhaps worth noting that this discussion took place in Oldham, a town that gained some 
attention in the riots of 2001, and is widely seen as a place where the Cantle report’s (2001) 
conception of communities leading “parallel lives” has considerable purchase. This sense of 
distance, in this instance, correlated with support for extensive counter-terrorism powers, 
with participant A above advocating significant and intrusive counter-terrorism powers. In a 
discussion about extremist preachers, for instance, he argued for swift treatment – ‘just get 
them out, next plane’ – stating that those who incite, or support terrorism should ‘lose any 
rights’ (Oldham, Male, White). Such support was echoed by another who argued of stop and 
search: ‘personally, I won’t care being stopped as… well I have nothing to hide, it wouldn’t 
affect me that much’ (Oxford, White, Female). Another example can be drawn from a focus 
group in London, where a black woman voiced her opposition to stop and search before 
saying: ‘But the rest, I guess because it hasn’t directly affected me, I’m indifferent to them’ 
(London, Black, Female). The sense of distance, then, leads to significant variations with 
Muslim and “target” subjects, who point to personal experience and collective narratives of 
counter-terrorism as immanent and pressing. For others, it seems to matter very little, if at all. 
Indeed, we might suggest that such differences point to the ways in which counter-terrorism 
powers may contribute to the living of “parallel lives”. 
This sense that counter-terrorism is ‘happening on a level that never touches us’ 
(Oldham, White, Male) was, in some instances, further buttressed by a nonchalance toward 
the threat of terrorism. As one participant put it: ‘They say terrorism is the big threat, but 
you’ve got to think where that would be in Britain. It wouldn’t be in Swansea, it wouldn’t be 
where I live anyway’ (Swansea, White, Male). Later, expressing reservations about some of 
the counter-terrorism powers under discussion, this same person argued that his scepticism: 
‘might just be me personally feeling quite safe here, in a middle class part of Swansea… I 
think that’s why I frown upon this’ (Swansea, White, Male). In these cases, counter-terrorism 
categorisations (where “white” populations are rarely deemed to be “risky”) intersect with 
individuals’ self-identifications (being middle class “good citizens”) to produce a sense of 
distance from counter-terrorism. This distance can thus function in at least two ways. The 
first, as in the Oldham focus group cited at length above, is to generate support for extensive 
counter-terrorism powers. As one Muslim respondent in Birmingham argued, support for 
increasing pre-charge detention periods was more likely from: ‘someone who would never be 
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subjugated to it, or never know anyone that was going to be subjugated to it’ (Birmingham, 
Asian, Male). The second, as with the respondent from Swansea, leads instead to a critical 
questioning, whereby feeling unthreatened by terrorism might lead to a questioning of the 
necessity of counter-terrorism powers.  
 
Conclusions 
This article has assessed the relationship between identity claims and subject positions, and 
attitudes toward counter-terrorism powers within the UK. By exploring four different types of 
identity claim that emerged in focus group discussions, it adds “bottom up” empirical 
richness to existing scholarship on this nexus. Through analysis of four articulated categories 
– “the Muslim”, “the target”, “the woman” and “the unaffected” – the article illustrates what 
appears to be a co-constitutive relationship between identity and counter-terrorism powers. 
Thus, on the one hand, how people make sense of their own sense of self (and the identity of 
others) impacts upon how counter-terrorism powers are understood and evaluated (as 
necessary, discriminatory, acceptable and so forth). At the same time, (understandings of) 
counter-terrorism powers appear to create specific identity positions (‘the unaffected’ or ‘the 
target’), which are subsequently negotiated and inhabited by individuals. Such subject 
positions variously draw upon or resist traditional identity categories (relating to ethnicity and 
gender, in particular), while other types of (class, sexual, cultural, and other) identity less-
explored in our discussion no doubt also play into these dynamics in complex ways. 
Although our findings are suggestive of the importance of different identity claims in 
relation to counter-terrorism, they also indicate the need for further research. For instance, as 
detailed above, we encountered troubling findings with regard to attachment to (or the 
openness of) notions of “Britishness”, with many individuals identifying as Muslim no longer 
feeling (able to be) British (see also Croft 2012), because of racialised readings of either, or 
both, of these categories. At the same time, our research also showed the pertinence of other 
non-religious identities for public attempts to make sense of this policy context. As detailed 
above, for instance, being gendered female translates, for some of our participants, to a 
greater vulnerability to targeting and stigma, whilst for others, it may mitigate such processes. 
Similarly, while many white participants in our research felt personally distanced from the 
workings of counter-terrorism, a number of those identifying as black felt vulnerable to 
singling out by the state, often approaching such powers as an intensification of an already 
racist body politic. In short, our research indicates the need for greater attention to the 
multiplicity and intersectionality of identity claims (Crenshaw 1991) that are clearly 
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important in this context, and how combinations of gendered, racial and other subjectivities 
might be experienced or appropriated by diverse citizens.  
Finally, our research also suggests that if creating a more cohesive society is 
considered a goal of counter-terrorism – if, as David Cameron (2011) suggested, the creation 
and sustaining of very different lived, social experiences is a barrier to security – then 
counter-terrorism powers, as experienced by many of our respondents, may complicate such 
cohesion. For some, counter-terrorism measures impacted on their lives in fundamental ways, 
in some cases making them feel less able to consider themselves British. For other 
individuals, the effects of these powers were minimal, with counter-terrorism making very 
little difference to their lives. Such divergent experiences, suggestive of a different kind of 
“parallel lives”, do not seem to point towards cohesion, but rather may risk undermining it 
(see also Thomas, 2010).  
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i Our framing of this sentence itself demonstrates the problem charted by Foucault in his work on authorship.  
ii The likely reading of our own subject positions as white, male, middle class academics by participants in our 
focus groups, of course, furthered our sensitivity here. 
iii We return to the relationship between gender and counter-terrorism powers below. 
iv It was unclear whether this search was a Schedule 7 search, under the 2000 Terrorism Act, or a “routine” 
search by airport security staff. But following Blackwood et al. (2013), we focus on the subjective 
interpretations of our respondent(s), who in this case, saw the experience as representing “officialdom” 
v Participants’ names have been changed. 
